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Executive Summary
l. The irregularities and problems encountered in the run-up to the elections
and in the balloting and counting phases cast very serious doubts indeed on
the freeness and fairness of the general elections held in Kenya on 29
December 1992. The credible and corroborated evidence adduced, even if
part of it may be merely circumstantial or impressionistic, will go a long
way towards supporting such a conc1usion. It is doubtful, however, whether
it is sufficient for passing a definitive judgement.
2. The Electoral Commssion was severely criticised for lack of
consultation and transparency, which in turn led to suspicions of partiality.
A particularly contentious issue was the financial bankruptcy of its
chairman, which cast doubts on his fitness for service on the Electoral
Commission. Criticisms were also raised with regard to inadequate
preparation for the elections.
3. The registration of voters was seriously compromised. A registration
period of six weeks seems far too short for any country, but particularly so
for a country like Kenya, with a predominantly rural population with long
distances to the registration centres, and an apparent lack of training and
education in the significance and procedures of voter registration. There
were convincing indications that significant numbers of potential voters
were unable to register because they had not been issued national identity
cards and were thus effectively disenfranchised.
4. While the presidential nomination has been described as "a study in
fairness", the nomination of civic and parliamentary candidates was marred
by a number of alleged irregularities and widespread violence to which the
police failed to respond appropriately. Reports of candidates who were
interfered with during their attempts to present their nomination papers
ranged from kidnapping, involuntary "disappearance", theft of candidates'
nomination fees and destruction of registration papers. The way in which
the nomination was conducted by the Electoral Commssion was met with
consternation and wrath by opposition parties. Some threatened to withdraw
from the process altogether and boycott the elections.
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5. Defections by prominent party members and nominees caused
widespread suspicion of harassment and bribery. There were allegations of
buying of prominent politicians or candidates to induce defection from one
party to another, mainly from the opposition to the ruling party. Defections
occurred over a long period of time, sometimes involving second-time
defections (in several cases, defectors from KANU defected back to the
party after a short period). Defections of this kind continued even after the
civic and parliamentary nominations; in the final run-up to the elections the
situation was so serious that the Attorney General had to warn candidates
that "the law did not provide for defection or withdrawal of candidates who
have been validly nominated by their respective parties" .
6. Since October 1991 a series of politically instigated so-called tribal
clashes had occurred in parts of the country, in particular in some areas of
Rift Valley and Western Provinces. Tens of thousands of innocent people
had been displaced after their homes had been burnt down, and hundreds
had been killed. These clashes created a volatile security situation which
significantly hampered an effective democratic process in these areas. They
produced a political climate of hostility , and are likely to have influenced
the voting pattern in the affected areas. Mobile polling stations, promised
by the Electoral Commssion to be ambulating in the affected areas, never
appeared.
7. Through investigative journalism the printed media offered critical in-
depth articles on candidates, parties and election issues in the run-up to the
election, despite an element of self-censorship. The diversity of the dailies
as well as weeklies and monthlies ensured broad coverage. Access to the
electronic media was perceived by obServers,monitors and opposition
parties alike as one the most contentious issues of the campaign period. Not
only did KANU receive disproportionately more air time than the
opposition, but news items about KANU were also invariably positive and
those about opposition parties always negative. There is little doubt that
limited access to the electronic media greatly disadvantaged the opposition
parties during the election campaign.
8. Election day proceeded with astonishing peace and quiet, thanks to what
some observers terme d the "dogged determination" of the Kenyan people
to exercise their democratic right. However, tensions ran high and an
atmosphere of extreme suspicion overshadowed the outwardly peaceful
process, leading to frustration and in some cases outbreaks of violence in
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and around polling stations. The frustrations of the electorate were due
largely to the clearly inadequate logistics of the elections.
9. The majority of polling stations opened later than the announced time.
The late opening of stations was explained by the late arrival of election
materials, be they ballot boxes, registers or ballot papers, or indeed the late
arrival of presiding officers or election clerks.
10. Insufficient or wrong election materials continued to cause delays
during the voting. In a good number of polling stations, voting had to be
temporarily halted because ballot papers ran out. Necessary implements,
such as ink and stamps, were also insufficiently provided for.
11. Accusations that voters were unduly influenced were levelled against
election officials and parties alike. Allegations of undue voter influencing
were particularly strong with regard to the large number of illiterate voters,
or those who appeared to require procedural assistance.
12. Allegations abounded about "importation" of voters across the country
to particularly contested districts, implicating both KANU and opposition
parties. Such malpractices were distinctly possible, as indicated by repeated
comments and warnings on the matter by the Electoral Commssion.
13. The organisational shortcomings and irregularities of election day
caried over into the counting process. Serious delays in starting the
counting were experienced due to the late arrival of ballot boxes from the
polling stations to the counting centres. Although in most instances
transport problems were cited as the cause of the delays, they seemed
inordinately long in urban and semi-urban constituencies alike, as in
N airobi. The protracted and controversial nature of the counting process
also led to deteriorating security conditions. Election results were slow in
being announced, far beyond what could have been expected due to delays
in the counting process.
14. The presidential elections, with a turn-out rate of 68.4 per cent, gave
President Moi a fresh mandate for another five-year term, given the
country' s plurality system of election. With 1,962,866 votes Moi beat his
closest rival, Kenneth Matiba, by a comfortable margin of 558,600 votes.
The number of votes gamered by Moi accounted for 36.3 per cent of the
total cast, whereas Matiba got 26 per cent. However, an alliance of any two
of the other three major contenders would have out-voted Moi. Together the
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three of them accounted for 63 per cent of the total vote. In other words,
Moi does not enjoy the support of the majority of the Kenyan people, just
over one-third of the electorate.
15. It is revealing to look at the distribution of votes for Moi. His home
province, Rift Valley, repeatedly declared an exclusive "KANU zone", is
clearly his Kalenjin stronghold, although in percentage terms he also carried
North Eastern (inhabited predominantly by ethnic Somali) by a wide
margin. By contrast Moi's support in Central Province is negligible;
similarly his support is very weak in Nairobi and Nyanza provinces.
Despite these disparities in support, Moi garnered at least 25 per cent of the
vote in five of the eight provinces, as required by the Constitution to
become elected president. With some justification Moi may thus claim
broader support nationwide than any of his competitors, despite faring
dismally in Central and Nyanza provinces. This geography of support
testifies to the persistence of the politics of ethnicity in Kenya.
16. KANU won 36 of the 44 seats from Rift Valley, 17 of the 20 seats in
Coast Province, eight of the ten seats from North Eastern and 21 of the 32
seats in Eastern. FORD-Asili, by contrast, won 14 of the 25 seats in Central
Province and 6 of the 8 seats in Nairobi. With the L O seats in Central
Province won by DP, FORD-Kenya was the only other party that managed
to win a seat in Central Province, but its candidate was a Kikuyu. Up to a
point, the four major parties may be said to be regionally based.
17. The overall parliamentary constellation in the aftermath of the elections
is such that KANU with its 100 seats has an absolute majority, whereas the
opposition commands 88 seats. In addition the President may nominate 12
MPs but even with this addition the incumbent party falls short of the
three-quarter majority required to amend the Constitution. Conversely, the
opposition is even further away from succeeding in making amendments to
the Constitution, with which they are highly dissatisfied.
18. The opposition was reluctant to acknowledge defeat. On L January
1993, leaders of the three opposition parties called a joint press conference
to announce their rejection of the results on grounds that the election had
been massively rigged. This move met with criticism from within their own
ranks and among clergymen who seemed to feel that Parliament would be
a better arena for continuing the struggle. Elements of the opposition also
directed criticism against their leaders for not hav ing realised the dangers
of splitting the opposition vote three ways and thus serving victory on a
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silver plate for Moi. Repeated calls in the run-up to the elections for unit y
in the opposition had fallen on deaf ears.
19. Despite countless irregularities observed, the authors of this report are
not prepared to pass a judgement, in unequivocal terms, that the Kenyan
general elections of 1992 were free and fair, or that they were not free and
fair. The difficulty in adducing inadequate evidence is associated with the
brevity of the visits by internationalobservers and their limited number,
hardly commensurate with the tas k. Jf election monitoring were to be
likened to conducting a sample survey, one might say that the sample was
small and biased, the response rate was low and the margin of error
correspondingly wide. The political sensitivity of the situation did not make
it any easier to validate responses.
20. The elections of 29 December 1992, despite flaws and irregularities, no
doubt signify that Kenya is moving in a democratic direction relative to the
situation prior to the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution. The run-up
to the election and the period of political fermentation before that time, the
campaign and the elections themselves have created a wider democratic
space in Kenya. The embryo of a new democratic political culture is
discernable; from it there is likely to emerge a genuinely democratic
practice. True, there will continue to be setbacks and hurdles to be
overcome. But the path and direction have been charted and it is now for
the people of Kenya to mo ve along, however arduously and painstakingly.
21. The problems of coverage and evidence resulting in the inability of
observer team to pass definitive and unequivocal judgements as to the
freeness and fairness of elections, warrant a self-critical note. Whereas the
institution of election observing is worth defending, a minimum of
professionalism is required on the part of election observers in the
discharge of their duties. Inadequate attention has thus far be en devoted to
specifying a set of criteria to be satisfied in order to enhance the
professionalism of election observing. There ought at least to be clear rules
of thumb on several requirements. Such rules relate to the ratio of
internationalobservers and local monitors to the number of polling stations;
geographical deployment; reporting and flow of information; proper liaison
between internationalobservers and local monitors; duration of stay before
and after election day as well as pre-election visits; country expertise of the
teams; and better coordination between observer teams and donors.
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1. Background
1.1 Fundamentals of Kenya's Political System and
History 1963-911
Kenya became a republic on 12 December 1964, after only ane year with
a federal (so-called Majimbo) constitution and the Queen of England as the
formal head of state. A new Constitution was adopted based on a unitary
state and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) to ok office as the
ruling party, which has remained in government to date. At about the same
time the other major party, Kenya African Democratie Union (KADU)
dissolved itself and joined forces with KANU.
The Constitution provides for a division of powers between the
Executive, the National Assembly (Parliament) and the Judiciary. The
powers of the Executive are vested in an elected President, who has
normally stood unopposed for direct election by universal suffrage. The
President appoints ministers from among the Members of Parliament to
form his Cabinet. There is constitutional provision for Parliament to pass
a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, in which case the President and his
Cabinet would have to resign. Parliament has 188 elected members and 12
additional members nominated by the President, plus the Attorney-General
as an ex officio non-voting member. Chapter V of the Constitution contains
a Bill of Rights setting out the fundamental rights and freedoms of Kenyan
citizens. Thus, except for a constitutional amendment passed on 9 June
1982 by virtue of which Kenya became a de jure one-party state, Kenya' s
constitutional arrangements closely resemble those of a liberal democratic
state.
However, beyond the formal institutions and procedures prescribed in the
Constitution, subsidiary legislation and political practices have over the
years, to some degree, modified constitutional custom. Above all, events
following the aborted coup d' etat in 1982 served to strengthen the powers
of the Executive at the expense of Parliament and the Judiciary. Although
this trend was evident also under Kenyatta, it was further reinforced under
This background account draws on ch. 3 in Arne Tostensen and John Scott (eds.), Kenya
Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1987).
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Moi in the 1980s. A political culture emerged which put the President
beyond reproach. Whatever democratic political debate existed previously
had gradually been replaced by a personalistic st yle of rule through
executive directives and orders. Criticism, however constructive and well
founded in facts, tended to be dismissed outright as "anti-Nyayo'''.2
After the dissolution of KADU in 1964 it was not until 1966 that a new
partyemerged, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), when some 30 KANU
MPs defected to form their own party under the leadership of then Vice-
President Oginga Odinga. Having to rene w their mandate from the
electorate in the so-called "LittIe General Election", the majority of the
defectors lost their seats, largelyas a result of administrative harassment by
the state apparatus which, in effect, intervened in favour of one of the
contesting parties, viz. KANU. The failure in the 1992 general election to
de-link state structures from those of the ruling party is reminiscent of what
happened in 1966.3 Three years later, in 1969, the KPU was proscribed and
its leadership detained without triaL.
From 1969 until June 1982, Kenya remained a de facto, if not a de jure
one-party state. During this period KANU virtually ceased to function as
a party between elections every five years. Since Moi's take-over of the
Presidency in 1978, and particularly since the formal de jure introduction
of the one-party system in mid-1982, steps have been taken to overhaul the
party machinery and to revitalise KANU, including membership drives
which have at times been coercive.
Independent Kenya inherited a centralised system of government from the
colonial period, based on an administration controlled by Provincial and
District Commssioners, and below them cadres of District Officers, Chief
and Assistant Chiefs, who together represented the extended arm of the
Executive. This structure, referred to as the Provincial Administration, was
geared towards maintaining law and order. Although gradually also taking
on the task of development, the Provincial Administration has continued to
be used as a powerful means of repression, equipped with a host of legal
instruments of control.
Much security legislation was a colonial hangover, albeit with some
amendments to meet new circumstances, while new laws with colonial
2 The motto of Nyayo (meaning 'footprints' or 'footsteps') was first introduced by Moi
when he in 1978 succeeded Kenyatta to denote that he would follow the path of his
predecessor. The term has subsequently acquired the meaning that the citizens of Kenya
should follow in the footsteps of Moi.
3 See Susanne D. MuelIer, "Government and Opposition in Kenya 1966-69", Journal of
Modern African Studies, voL. 22, no. 3, 1984.
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antecedents were passed by Parliament. One particular ordinance was
retained as the Public Order Act, empowering the Executive to issue or
deny licences for holding public meetings, be they political or not. The
Preservation of Public Security Act predated independence; it was reenacted
in 1966, and provides for preventive detention without triaL. The
Registration of Societies Act, requiring all societies and associations to
register as such with the Registrar of Societies, has its counterpart in a
colonial ordinance. Likewise, the Chief' s Authority Act is a colonial
creation, conferring extensive powers on the Chiefs who form part of the
Provincial Administration.
The centralised state apparatus has been charge d with administering these
laws, and in collaboration with Special Branch, Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) and para-military General Service Unit (GSU) officers,
to function as a security network as well. At various levels Security
Committees have been established, whose duties are to gather intelligence
through police and informer networks, to defuse and control tense situations
in the interest of national security. In the one-party state they were also
used to prevent the emergence of new political organisations which might
compete with the ruling party.
Even state institutions which were to be independent of the Executive
came under pressure. In December 1986 Parliament passed a constitutional
amendment with four important provisions:
(a) the removal of security of tenure of the Office of the Attorney-
General;
(b) the removal of security of tenure of the Office of the Controller and
Auditor -General;
(c) the abolitioIi of the Office of the Chief Secretary;
(d) the increase of the minimum number of Parliamentary constituencies
from 158 to 168, and to a maximum of 188.
In the ensuing public debate, critics noted that this amendment was
tantamount to tampering with the system of checks andbalances enshrined
in the Constitution and jeopardising the independence of these critical
institutions.
Subsequently, in August 1988, a further constitutional amendment was
hastily passed which removed the security of tenure of the office of High
Court and Court of Appeal judges, a move widely seen as curtailing the
independence of the Judiciary. The same amendment also removed the
security of tenure of office for members of the Civil Service Commssion,
yet another move to strengthen the powers of the Executive. Lastly, the
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amendment empowered the police to detain capital offence suspects for
fourteen days before taking them to court.
From time to time the simmering of opposition underneath the repressive
lid has erupted in the form of riots and peaceful demonstrations, looting
(e.g. after the 1982 abortive coup), political assassinations (e.g. Tom Mboya
in 1969 and J .M. Kariuki in 1975) and the formation of clandestine
organisations such as Mwakenya.
Public debates in the late 1980s centred on such issues as corruption,
human rights and the queuing system of voting and the 70 per cent rule in
primaries (although onlyone partyallowed). Thechurches, particularlythe
N ational Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Law Society of
Kenya (LSK) were at the forefront as critics of the government,
demonstrating that opposition was widespread and growing.4
1.2 Towards a Multi-Party System
For a long time the government appeared able to contain the forces of
change. . But inounting internal discontent in the early 1990s compelledthe
Moi government into making concessions, however reluctantly, cautiously
and erratically.
In mid-1990 a KANU review commttee was set up to hear grievances
and proposals for political reform. After the commttee delivered its report
in late 1991, KANU decided to abolish the queuing system of voting and
the 70 per cent rule; to discontinue its practice of expulsion of members;
to establish a corrption tribunal; but reconfirmed its faith in the superiority
of the single-party system.
In November 1990 the security of tenure of the Office of the Attorney-
General, the Auditor-General and the judges was restored by a
constitutional amendment. In J anuary 1991 a number of expulsions of
former prominent KANU members were lifted. A new Attorney-General,
Amos Wako, was appointed in May 1991 to replace Mathew Muli, who
4 The queue system of voting, introduced in 1986 under the pretext of being transparent,
entails that party nominations are to be determned by way of queuing behind the
preferred candidate or a placard with the picture of the candidate. Apart from a range
of impracticalities, the system violates the secret ballot and leaves voters wide open to
intimidation and victimisation. The 70 per cent rule stipulates that if a candidate manages
to garner at !east 70 per cent of the votes in a primary partyelection, he or she wil be
elected unopposed. In a single-party system this means, in effect, that non-party members
not taking part in the primaries would be disenfranchised in their constituencies in the
general election.
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had come under fierce criticism. The appointment of Wako, then considered
a man of integrity, was generally welcomed.
Meanwhile, opposition forces of various persuasions pushed on.
Prominent lawyers associated with the LSK, such as Paul Muite, Gibson
Kamau Kuria, John Khaminwa, James Orengo, G.B.M. Kariuki, Lee
Muthoga, Kiraitu Murungi, Martha Njoka, Gitobu Imanyara, kept up
pressure on a number of issues ranging from human rights violations and
the independence of the Judiciary to broader matters of constitutional law.
Likewise prominent personalities of the churches, such as Manasses Kuria,
Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge, David Gitari, Timothy Nyoya and Samuel
Kobia, added to the breadth of criticism within civil society. Groups of
academics issued memoranda calling for an open democratic discourse.
Courageous individuals like Wangari Maathai and many others of lesser
prominence further contributed to the debate.
A spate of what appear to have been political assassinations contributed
to the heat of the struggle. The most prominent of these was the death on
13 February 1990 of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Ouko. An
official commssion of inquiry was set up to investigate the case. The
report, produced with the assistance of detectives from Scotland Yard, was
never made public. It may be surmised, however, that names of individuals
very close to the President were mentioned in the report. Other deaths
under somewhat mysterious circumstances (Alexander Muge, Hezekiah
Oyugi and Masinde Muliro) were widely seen to have resulted from
"arranged accidents" or "induced" natural deaths. Whatever the facts,
inadequate police investigation and/or post mortems not having been
performed, have failed to dispel doubts and fuelled suspicions of foul play.
Knowing that the next general election had to be held by March 1993,
politicians of the opposition became steadily more vocal in calling for
multi-partyism and more defiant of the government' s refusal to amend the
Constitution to this end. Kenya's first Vice-President, Oginga Odinga, took
the lead. Having made press statements already in early 1982 that he would
form a new party, he reiterated his intention in October 1990. And in
February 1991 he announced the formation of the National Democratic
Party (NDP) and sought registration under the Registration of Societies
Act. Registration was denied; after the matter had been taken to court, the
ruling of the High Court in July 1991 reconfirmed the Registrar's refusal
of registration.
Prominent politicians and businessmen Kenneth Matiba and Charles
Rubia at a joint press conference in May 1990 called for multi-partyism,
despite a KANU statement just one month previously to the effect that it
opposed multi-partyism on grounds that it would be ethnically divisive.
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About the time of the so-called Saba Saba riots in early July the same year,
both men were detained without tri al and held for nearly a year before their
release.
Having failed to register his NDP, Odinga spearheaded the formation in
August 1991 of a broad alliance named Forum for the Restoration of
Democracy (FORD) comprising most of the ethnic groups of the country,
with the exception of the Kalenjin. Since FORD was considered a forum
of less than ten personalities rather than a party, no registration was
required. However, FORD was clearly perceived as the precursor to a party
- as later turne d out to be the case.
In August-September 1991 . a public debate onMajimboismflaredup,
spurred by Kalenjin politicians in the Rift Valley, ostensibly as a federal
alternative to political pluralism. It is noteworthy that this initiative to
reintroduce a federal system of government came from the same ethnic
groups that before independence had advocated a Majimbo Constitution, i.e.
constituent groups of the now defunct KADU party, whose leaders at the
time included Daniel arap Moi. It came as no surprise that the debate
fanned sentiments of tribalism. Poorly disguised allusions to ethnically
homogeneous areas were made, with reference to the ethnic clashes
observed in several parts of the country over land and residence rights.
Although couched in different terms, the same sentiments reappeared later
in the heated electoral campaign, when certain areas were declared
exclusive zones of this or that party.
As political struggles intensified, the mass media, particularly the printed
media, assumed an increasingly important role. The scope of political
expression widened considerably through 1992. The three dailies were
active in promoting debate on issues and the activities of personalities. The
Kenya Times, owned by the ruling party, and the government Kenya News
Agency (KNA), understandably took a pro-government stand on most issues,
whereas the Daily Nation and the Standard took a more critical, though not
partisan, stance vis-à-vis the KANU government. A plethora of weekly
publications of variable quality had emerged, performing an important
democratic function in a mass-media situation which had previously been
much more restrictive. Pursuing the same line of critical journalism as the
previously banned Beyond and Financial Review, other weekly and monthly
magazines like Society, Finance, Nairobi Law Monthly and Jitegema
persisted despite harassment. The electronic media under government
control, i.e. Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) with respect to both
radio and TV, were not conducive to free debate. The exception was,
perhaps, the privately-owned TV station Kenya Television Network (KTN).
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In the face of persistent internal opposition coupled with increasing
pressures from abroad, the incumbent KANU government finally
succumbed. In December 1991 section 2A of the Constitution was repealed,
thus paving the way for multi-party politics.
As from early 1992 the political struggles gathered momentum and a host
of new parties were formed, notably the Democratic Party (DP) headed by
Mwai Kibaki, who on Christmas Day 1991 resigned from his government
post to form his own party. Within FORD, tensions mounted over
procedures and between personalities jostling for positions. These squabbles
were later to result in a split leading to the formation of FORD-Asili under
the leadership of Kenneth Matiba and FORD-Kenya under the leadership
of Oginga Odinga. Others left to form still another grouping under the
name of Kenya National Congress (KNC).
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2. Run-Up to Election Day
2.1 Electoral Reform and the Election Laws
The election process in Kenya is govemed by a number of constitutional
provisions, laws and statutory instruments. These specify in detail the
conditions under which elections are to be conducted, including the right
of candidates to have up to two agents at each polling station, the right to
inspect ballot boxes before polling starts, and the right of candidates to
have their own seals attached to ballot boxes once the presiding officer has
sealed them.5
Despite these and related provisions for safeguarding a free and fair
voting process, several issues and concerns soon became a source of
contention in the run-up to the December 1992 elections. The most
important among them included:
(a) the lack of public debate and consultation about electoral reforms and
a lack of involvement by the opposition parties;
(b) introduction of electoral reforms widely seen as designed to favour the
incumbent KANU Government;
(c) a series of ill-prepared and last-minute changes (or attempted changes)
of great significance in the electoral legislation.
In order to encourage a democratic culture of tolerance and trust and to
facilitate a political climate conducive to free and fair elections, it would
have been wise for the Government to have invited the political parties for
consultation and advice. For instance, in light of the distribution and pattern
of ethnic communities, arguably one of the most important bases of
electoral support, it would have been appropriate to review the election
system and its likely impact on the representation of various ethnic groups
5 These include the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act; the Local
Government Act; the Election Offenses Act; the Election Laws (Amendment) Act of
1992, and subsidiary legislation issued by government departments. Cf. Report of the
International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), Facing the Pluralis t Challenge:
Human Rights and Democratization in Kenya's December 1992 Multi-Party Elections,
(Washington D.C.: IHRLG, 1992), Ch. V.
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and regions, with a view to averting ethnic divisions within the electorate.6
As the process unfolded, no consultation of this kind took place.
Rather, electoral reforms were made through a series of hurried changes,
allegedly in favour of the incumbent party, or piecemeal and last-minute
measures. It is hard to see how such an approach could correspond to the
requirements of a free and fair electoral process in which any contemplated
procedural or other changes are to be communicated to all parties, and
debated publicly long before the start of the electoral campaign. The most
important of these hurriedly instituted reforms included the following:
(1) On 5 August 1992 Parliament amended to the Constitution to the
effect that any presidential candidate, . in addition towinning.. a
parliamentary seat and receiving a plurality of the total votes cast
nationwide, would also have to garner at least 25 per cent of the vote in at
least five of the country' s eight provinces. Although there may be some
justification for a provision which would secure an elected President broad
support regionally and ethnically, the required level of support was widely
interpreted to disadvantage the opposition, which had only rudimentary
organisational capabilities on a national basis. Conversely, it was seen to
favour the incumbent party, which had a well-established machinery
throughout the country.
(2) Furthermore, the constitutional amendment required that the elected
President form a government from his own party only. This provision was
also interpreted by the opposition as a safeguard measure on the part of the
KANU Government to retain executive powers in case Moi should win the
presidential election and KANU lose majority in Parliament, by blocking
a coalition government by an alliance of multiple opposition parties.
A serious concern about these amendments related to the lack of prior
consultation between the Government and the opposition. The amendments
added to an atmosphere of confrontation which jeopardised a peaceful
election campaign and orderly conduct of the elections. These amendments,
and the way in which they were introduced, ran counter to the principles
of multi-party democracy, by which key changes of the electoral laws
would require consultation with the principal political actors.7
6 Kenya has an electoral system of plurality vote in single-member constituencies, which
tends to favour the emergence of a two-party system. In view of the varied ethnic
composition of Kenyan society it would be of great interest to consider the effects of
proportional electoral systems on democratic representation by minor parties from
comparatively smaller ethnic groups.
7 Cf. IHRLG report, op.cit., p. 16.
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(3) In November 1992, the Attorney General, apparently with the consent
of the Electoral Commission, made an "interpretation" and "typographical"
correction of the election law which reduced the time-period required to
elapse between the date of the announcement of the election date and the
date of the nomination for candidates, effectively restricting the nomination
period to a mere eight days.8 On 12 November the opposition, represented
by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Gitobu Imanyara and Hassan Kadir, filed a
complaint to the High Court, in respons e to which the court dismIssed the
change in the electoral code, saying that it was "too legalistic a point to
take in a matter of such grave importance to the country". By that time,
however, the matter had done a great deal of harm in terms of adding
tension to an atmosphere already charged with mistrust and suspicion.
2.2 The Electoral Commission
According to the Constitution, the Electoral Commission is appointed by
the President. This notwithstanding, it is an independent body of salaried
members with constitutional security of tenure. The functions of the
Electoral Commssion inc1ude the preparation and supervision of elections,
maintenance and revision of voters' registers, determination of the number
of constituencies and their delimitation, and promotion of voter education.
The Electoral Commission preparing for the 29 December elections was
established before the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution, which paved
the way for multi-partyism. Despite significant amendments to the
Constitution and the political system subsequently, the government did not
avail itself of the opportunity to change the composition of the Electoral
Commssion as well. In failing to do so, the government may have missed
an opportunity of increasing confidence in the electoral process. In fact, the
composition of the Commssion became one among several serious
complaints levelled against it and its operation. Throughout 1992, the
Kenyan opposition, international organisations and diplomatic envoys
8 The election law enacted earlier in the year furnished parties with "not less than 21
days" after the day on which the public notice of the election day was made to file
parliamentary nominations. Similarly, the general election campaign period would be
"not less than 14 days" from the nomination date (Election Laws (Amendment) Act,
1992, Section 6.) When the opposition learned of this on 3 November, it was horrified.
The Attorney General claimed that the change of wording had been made because it was
ilogical to allow a shorter period of time for the general election campaign than for the
nomination process. Cf. IHRLG report, ap.eit., p. 16.
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repeatedly requested President Moi to appoint a new commission in which
the opposition parties would be represented, but in vain.9
Apart from lack of consultation, serious doubts were cast on the
suitability, credibility and commtment of the chairman of the Electoral
Commssion, Justice Zachaeus Chesoni, who had made it clear earlier that
he was not in favour of a multi-party form of governance.lO Two issues
were particularly important:
First, according to judicial records it was publicly known that Chesoni
had been removed from his office as a judge of the Court of Appeal
because of financialembarrassment.11 The personal credibility .of the
chairman of the Commission. in the eyes of the public at large, 
and the
opp,osition parties in particular, was considerably tamished as aresult.
Complaints of a similar nature were made that Chesoni and certain
members of the Commission were unfit for service because they were
believed to "take orders" from the ruling party. Allegations of this kind
have not been substantiated, but their persistence testifies to the lack of
confidence in the impartiality of the Commssion.
Second, there was serious lack of transparency in the work of the
Commssion. As. late. as November 1992 it was reported that the Chairman
was "extremely secretive" not only towards opposition parties but also
towards his fellow commissioners.12 More serious, perhaps, was the slow,
belated and apparently inadequate logistical preparation for the elections,
the result of which became evident on election day (cf. section on Election
Day). Despite ample time, more than one year, the Commssion's
seriousness and earnestness in preparing for the smooth administration of
the elections was apparent only during a few hectic weeks before polling
day.
Whatever difficulties exist in evaluating the effects of the performance
of the Electoral Commission on the conduct and outcome of the elections,
it is our assessment that the Commssion did little to create an atmosphere
of confidence and trust in the process, which was badly needed in a
politically tense situation. Notwithstanding commendable efforts in the
9 Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights, Closing in on Elections: Accountability
in the Kenyan Electoral Process, (Washington D.C: KMCHR, August 1992), p. 9.
10 Cf. IHRLG report, op.cit., p. 19.
11 Cf. Commonwealth Secretariat, The Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic Elections in
Kenya, 29 December, 1992. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group,
(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993), Annex ix detailing the circumstances of
his removaL.
12 Cf. IHRLG report, op.cit., p. 20.
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\ weeks immediately prior to the elections, the preparations made by the
Electoral Commssion were clearly inadequate. The execution of the
elections was mared by numerous irregularities and deviations from basic
democratic principles of transparency and fairness, during balloting as well
as during the counting phase (cf. section on Counting).
2.3 Registration of V oters
A crucial issue in a democratic system is how to decide on criteria and
procedures for including, and/or justifiably and lawfully excluding, citizens
from the right to vote and to stand for office. In Kenya this became a
critical issue with potentially far-reaching consequences, whose precise
nature still remains to be explored.
With some qualifications, Kenyan law entitles any citizen of at least 18
years of age on the date of registration to register. Any registered citizen
is eligible for office and entitled to vote.13 The registration of voters
started on 8 June 1992 and closed, after two short extensions, on 20 July.
Regrettably, there is significant evidence to show that the registration
process was seriously flawed.14 The most serious problems and allegations
were the following:
First, a registration period of six weeks seems much too short for any
country, but particularly so for a country like Kenya with a predominantly
rural population with long distances to the registration centres, and an
apparent lack of training and education in the significance and procedures
of voter registration.
Second, there were convincing indications that significant numbers of
p otenti al voters were unable to register and were thus effectively
disenfranchised. In Kenya any voter is required to have a registration card
in order to be able to vote. To register as a voter, a citizen has to identify
13 Among the main additional conditions are the requirement that, in order to register, a
citizen must have been resident in Kenya for at least ane year, or must have resided in
Kenya for an aggregate period of not less than four years in the past eight years.
Furthermore, he or she must have been, for a period aggregating not less than five
months in the preceding 12 months, ordinarily resident in the constituency, or have
carried on business, or have been employed,or have possessed land or residential
buildings within the constituency. Excluded from registration (and thereby lawfully
disenfranchised) are persons who are of unsound mind, are undischarged bankrupts, or
are detained in lawful custody or have been convicted of an election offence within the
past five years.
14 Kenyan political observers and commentators referred to the conduct of the registration
of voters as one element in the structural rigging of the elections.
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himself or herself by producing a national identity card. However, the
issuing of ID cards had been seriously delayed over the last years, which
prevented registration by a large number of young people who had reached
the age of 18 years since the previous registration exercise in 1988. The
Electoral Commission claimed itwasunable to remedy the problem as
issuing ID cards was the responsibility of the government, not that of the
Commssion.
There is no reliable and authoritative source to ascertain the number of
eligible voters who might have been disenfranchised. Estimatesrange from
one to five million. One estimate, based on the Kenya population profile
available in the Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook 1992 indicates a
shortfallof same 2.5 million voters out of an estimated voting-age
population of 10.4 million, which suggests that about 25 per cent of the
eligible voters did not register. It is likely, of course, that a substantial
share of these potential voters did not bother to register due to apathy or
deliberate boycott. Still, there are abundant reasons to believe that a
significant number of potential young voters were disenfranchised, either
through inappropriate measures to address the problem of ID cards or
through "bureaucratic inefficiencies". Both explanations cast serious doubts
on the democratic nature of the elections. Such deficiencies represent in and
by themselves a serious reservation about the fairness of the electoral
process.
Third, it was alleged before members of the present team that registration
of voters continued after the officially announced closing date of the
registration period. Complaints were also heard that access to voters'
registers were difficult because the registers were not open for inspection
at the hours announced, or were opened at dates different from those
announced.15
Lastly, voters' cards were shown to members of the present team on
which the ID number of the person in question differed from that recorded
on the voter's card. An ICJ/FIDA report refers to a number of cases where
the electoral register lacked names, addresses, or ID card numbers of voters
in the register. A more peculiar example was the use of the same P.O. Box
address for 13,172 voters in N akuru District, Reg. Unit no. 61/1, and a
similar one involving 5,000 voters with the same P.O. Box address in
Nakuru District, Reg. Unit no. 64/1.16 A former MP for Molo constituency
raised the issue of ¡ake voters who he claimed had been registered in Molo
15 Cf. IHRLG report, op.cit., p. 24.
16 The P.O. Box numbers for Reg. unit no. 61/1 and Reg. unit 64/1 were 290 Molo and 127
Molo, respectively.
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long after the closing date of registration. He asked how more than 10,000
voters could have been registered in Molo when the local primary school
of that area only has about 300 registered pupils.17 This was but one of
several allegations of "imported voters" in hotly contested areas.
A vailable information from a variety of written sources and interviews
leads to the conclusion that the registration of voters was seriously
compromised, the most notable result bein g the effective
disenfranchisement of a significant number of potential voters. Moreover,
the faulty registration process created public mistrust in the electoral
process from its very start.
2.4 Nominations
Nomination of candidates took place on 9 December 1992 for civic and
parliamentary candidates, and on 14 December for presidential candidates.
The difference in the conduct of the two nomination exercises was
remarkable. While the presidential nomination has been described as "a
study in fairness", the nomination of civic and parliamentary candidates
was marred by various alleged irregularities and widespread violence to
which the police failed to respond appropriately.
Prior to the nominations, several prospective opposition candidates
expressed fears about their security, and worries that they might be harassed
and attacked on the eve of nomination day.18 Despite calls on the
chairman of the Electoral Commission to provide security for such
candidates, it never materialised. Reports of candidates who were interfered
with during their attempts to present their nomination papers ranged from
kidnapping, involuntary "disappearance", theft of candidates' nomination
fees and destruction of registration papers. A total of 43 prospective
opposition candidates complained that they had been hindered in presenting
their nomination papers, mainly by KANU supporters or civil servants.
Samples of complaints were made available to the present team, and
elaborated upon by a lawyer representing some of the plaintiffs.
The way in which the nomination was conducted by the Electoral
Commission was met with consternation and wrath by opposition parties.
Some threatened to pull out of the process altogether and boycott the
elections. Criticism was levelled against the Electoral Commssion for
17 Society, 28 December 1992, p. 9.
18 Society, 28 December 1992, p. 20.
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allowing nomination papers to be submitted during five hours only (from
8:00 a.m to 1:00 p.m. on nomination day).
The chairman of the Electoral Commission, in response to these
allegations and criticisms, claimed he was powerless to act, saying that
there was no legal provision which would enable him to order a repe at of
the nomInation in affected areas.19 Nonetheless, on 11 December the
Chairman met with representatives of political parties and agreed to form
a commttee composed of election commssioners to look into alleged
administrative malpractices during the nomination process. He ruled out,
however, the possibility of looking into the legal aspects of the matter,
which would have to be referred to a court of law.
Despite this constructive effort, Chesoni only two days later declared that
KANU had successfully nominated 16 candidates unopposed, and lamented
that in none of the 43 cases of complaint examined by the commissioners
could a decision be reached "because most of the complainants had not
given evidence".20 According to information available to the present team
all of these candidates were standing for election in Rift Valley province,
in so-called "KANU zones". Similar problems were reported in Wajir
District of North Eastern Province.
In summary, reports presented to the present observer team by
independent organisations, opposition parties, lawyers and independent
observers suggest that the nominations process was seriously flawed in
certain areas of the country, and that the time allocated for candidates to
file their nomination papers was remarkably short and insufficient to ensure
a smooth nomination exercise. The inadequate respons e by the Electoral
Commission to most serious allegations of fraud and irregularities did not
contribute to the fairness of the election process, but rather compromised
severely this part of the election campaign.21
19 This interpretation of the law, however, stands out in contrast to the interpretation of
Section 41(10) of the Constitution by Professor of Constitutional Law, Kivutha Kibwana,
who claims that "the Electoral Commission could easily ensure or have ensured that
....(R)eturning officers who concluded civic and parIiamentary elections nominations in
the face of obvious electoral malpractices re-open such nomination", Daily Nation, 22
December 1992.
20 Society, 28 December 1992, p. 21.
21 This conclusion, in addition to information collected by this team, draws upon
observations made by the advance team of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Cf.
Commonwealth News Release, Nairobi, 13 December 1992.
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2.5 Defections
Defections by prominent party members and nominees, mostly from the
opposition to KANU, attracted much public attention, and caused
widespread suspicion of harassment and bribery. Although hard evidence
is difficult to come by, several credible observers expressed concern about
"purchasing of voters (and voters' cards) and candidates". Persistent
circulation of such allegations for a very long period made us note with
concern that the prosecuting authorities (e.g. the Attorney General) did not
take appropriate action to have such rumours denied or confirmed.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that responsibility for curbing such
practices also rests with the political leaders of all parties.
There were mainly three types of alleged money transfers reported in the
press and by individual observers:
(a) bribing of voters, or buying of voters' cards. Numerous complaints
were lodged by opposition parties that KANU was distributing money
to gain the support of voters. Testimonies were also heard that some
opposition parties were guilty of such malpractices as well;
(b) buying of prominent politicians or candidates to induce defection from
one party to another, mainly from the opposition to the ruling party.
Defections occurred over a long period of time, sometimes involving
second-time defections (in several cases, defectors from KANU
defected back to the party after a short period). Defections of this kind
continued even after the civic and parliamentary nominations; in the
final run-up to the elections the situation was sa serious that the
Attorney General had to warn candidates that "the law did not provide
for defection or withdrawal of candidates who have been validly
nominated by their respective parties" .12
(c) alleged transfers of money to opposition candidates/parties from the
government.
The final upshot of these incidents or alleged incidents could not be
validated for the present observer team. However, there are enough
indications to condude that bribery of voters and so-called defections of
candidates, even after the dosing of nominations, may have been extensive
and are likely to have caused confusion on the part of voters, and may have
influenced voting patterns.
22 Daily Nation, 25 December 1992.
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2.6 Ethnic CIashes
Since October 1991 a series of politically instigated so-called tribal clashes
had occurred in parts of the country, in particular in some areas of Rift
Valley and Western Provinces. Tens of thousands of innocent people had
been displaced after their homes had been burnt down, and hundreds had
been killed.13 The incidents were reported in the press over the past year,
and reliably documented by a tas k force to monitor the clashes, set up by
Symposium I (organised by opposition parties, NGOs, professional bodies
andpressure groupsunderthe auspices of the National Council ofChurches
in Kenya - NCCK), as well as a Parliamentary Select Committee (the
CIashes Report). The former report was released in July 1992, while the
latter, also referred to as the "Kiliku report" (after the commttee chairman,
Kennedy Kiliku), was tabled in Parliament in September 1992.24 Excerpts
from its 238 pages were widely quoted in the press.25 However, the report
was rejected by Parliament.26
According to the above reports the ethnic clashes first occurred in late
October 1991 inconjunction with the so-called Majimbo rallies which
started in September, at which KANU politicians in Rift Valley were
campaigning for regionalism (Majimboism), and warning the Kalenjin (a
collection of ethnic groups inhabiting the Rift V alley) that they risked being
"evicted" from Rift Valley Province in a multi-party democracy. The
reports also stated that the ethnic clashes invariably pitted the Kalenjin and
Maasai in the Rift Valley Province against "virtually all other ethnic groups
residing in western Kenya".17
Irrespective of the facts and root causes of the clashes which had been
unfolding since October-November 1991 and throughout 1992, there is
enough evidence to conclude that they impacted adversely on election
preparations in the affected areas (the hardest hit areas were located on the
boundary between Western and Nyanza Provinces, and the Rift Valley).
23 According to estimates included in the Select Parliamentary "CIashes Report" tab led in
ParIiament in September 1992, 54,000 people had been displaced and 779 killed by 15
July that year. Later thousands more were displaced and many kiled. Cf. Weekly Review,
25 September 1992. The "CIashes Report" concludes that the clashes "were politically
motivated and fuelled by some officers in the provincial administration" (Ibid., p. 15).
24 The NCCK report was basically mirrored by the Kiliku Report, including the names of
MPs allegedly involved in funding the "warriors" of the clashes.
25 Weekly Review, 25 September 1992, pp. 3-15.
26 Weekly Review, 23 October 1992, p. 12.
27 Quoted from Weekly Review, 25 September 1992, p. 11.
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The clashes created a volatile security situation which significantly
hampered an effective democratic process in these areas. They produced a
political climate of hostility, and are likely to have influenced the voting
pattern in the affected areas.
As pointed out by the reports referred to above, the local or central
authorities were not seen to be taking appropriate measures to prevent the
aggressors from continuing hostilities in order to ease tensions between
communities. No one was apprehended by the police, indicted or tried in
a court of law. Shortly before the elections, the chairman of the Election
Commission, Justice Chesoni, assured the displaced persons that mobile
polling stations would beambulatinginthe'affected areas,butthismeasure;
which would have enabled the displaced peoples to exercise their
democratic rights, was never implemented.
2.7 Access to the Mass Media During the Election Campaign
Through investigative journalism, the printed media offered critical in-depth
articles on candidates, parties and election issues in the run-up to the
election. The diversity of the dailies as well as weeklies and monthlies
ensured broad coverage. However, not all internationalobservers were
altogether satisfied with the performance of the press. The Commonwealth
. Observer Group expressed criticism of "a certain degree of self-censorship"
and criticised particularly the tendency of newspapers to emphasise
sensationalism over investigative articles on serious political issues, such
as the ethnic clashes.28 The International Human Rights Law Group in its
pre-election report also detected an element of self-censorship in the printed
news media and suggested, as far as the foreign-owned press was
concemed, that this might be attributable to a cautious attitude on the part
of foreign business interests in Kenya.29
It was access to the electronic media, however, that was perceived - by
observers, monitors and opposition parties alike - to be one the most
contentious issues of the campaign period, largely because radio
transmissions in particular have very broad nationwide coverage. The
Professional Committee for Democratic Change (PCDC), a local non-
governmental organisation that was a constituent part ofNEMU, monitored
news coverage of selected English-medium news broadcasts of both KBC
and KTN television and KBC radio before the election. It concluded that
28 Commonwealth Secretariat, ap. cit., pp. 26 and 27.
29 IHRLG report, ap.cit., p. 27.
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news coverage, particularly that of KBC, was heavily biased in favour of
the ruling party KANU. It was found that not only did KANU receive
disproportionately more air-time than the opposition, but also that news
items about KANU were invariably positive and those about opposition
parties always negative. It was also observed that the KBC and KTN
television stations allocated considerable air-time to news items that
depicted President Moi both as head of state and as party head of KANU,
sa that KANU party and state functions were imperceptibly mingled. 30
Between 22-26 October the news monitors found that KBC carried no
report on the apposition; in KTN news transmissions the ratio between
opposition and KANU news items was one to four, as well as offering no
film footage with news items from the opposition.31
Despite many submissions by the opposition parties and local and
international observers, the news coverage in the electronic media did not
improve to any noticeable degree, and calls for the suspension of
responsible media chiefs were not heeded. On the contrary, a KNT
television news editor was dismissed for covering the defection by a
prominent minister to. the opposition and others were threatened with
dismissaL. 32
There is little doubt that their limited access to the electronic media
greatly disadvantaged the opposition parties during the election campaign.
Furthermore, despite the relative independence of the print media, their
position was hamstrung by a certain degree of self-censorship, partly
brought about by past experience of harassment of critical journalists and
publications. Just how fragile independent and critical journalism really is
has been underscored in the short period after the elections, which has seen
the editor of a weekly magazine held by the police and questioned on
charges of sedition and whole editions of critical weeklies impounded by
the government.
2.8 The Contending Parties
Some parties had effectively been formed, though not registered as such,
even before the December 1991 repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution,
30 Professionals Committee for Democratie Change, Public Announcement Concerning the
Manner in which the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation is Discharging its Role as an
Independent and Impartial Broadcasting Organization, Nairobi, no date, appended to
IHRLG report, ap.eit., appendix J.
31 Ibid.
32 IHRLG, ap.eit., appendix F.
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which in 1982 had transformed Kenya into a de jure one-party state. This
constitutional amendment led to the emergence of a number of additional
opposition parties. Altogether nine new parties, in addition to the existing
KANU, managed to secure registration under the Registration of Societies
Act. Applications by three other parties were rejected. The most prominent
among these was the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) with a following among
Muslims in the coastal region; the other two were "green" environmentalist
parties. The rejection of IPK was made on grounds that it was a religious
group rather than a political party. The other two were rejected on vague
grounds of national security. 33
The completion of the nomination process finally saw seven opposition
parties contesting the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections. Three
of these parties, FORD-Kenya, FORD-Asili and Kenya National Congress
(KNC), could be traced back to the original loose opposition alliance
FORD. Together with Mwai Kibaki's Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) the
two FORD parties formed the three main opposition parties with the largest
following. The Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA), the Kenya
Social Congress (KSC), the Kenya National Congress (KNC) and the Party
of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK) remained localised and
relatively insignificant in voter strength.
The DP had been formed in January 1992, only a month after its leader,
Mwai Kibaki, a former Vice-President, had resigned from his ministerial
post in President Moi's cabinet. The party was perceived to be dominated
by the Kikuyu. Kibaki' s belated resignation from Moi' s Cabinet and the
composition of the party leadership contributed to an image of DP as
"composed of wealthy individuals who waited while others struggled and
sacrificed for the establishment of a multiparty system, only to ... try and
reap where they had never sown". 34
Meanwhile, FORD was beset by leadership rivaIries, first among Oginga
Odinga, Paul Muite and Martin Shikuku, and increasingly so with the return
of Kenneth Matiba in May 1992 from convalescence in London after a
stroke. Matiba received a tumultuous reception on his return and almost
immediately announced his candidacy for the presidency, despite reported
previous efforts by a delegation to London of prominent FORD members
to dissuade him from such plans.35
By June 1992 the situation within the opposition was tense. With Matiba,
a Kikuyu, and Odinga, a Luo, FORD hoped to resuscitate the erstwhile
33 IHRLG, ap.eit., appendix i.
34 Weekly Review, 5 June 1992, p. 5.
35 Africa Canfidential, vol. 33, no. 9, 8 May 1992.
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powerful Kikuyu-Luo alliance of the early 1960s, although it had been
weakened by the emergence of DP under Kibaki, also a Kikuyu. FORD
was in June 1992 reported to have denounced DP as being in secret
collusion with KANU.36 It was at the time suggested that KANU indeed
hoped that DP would split the Kikuyu vote. To that end, the state-owned
broadcasting network KBC apparently devoted extensive air-time to the first
rallies of DP while ignoring those of FORD.37 This soon changed, when
KANU attacked both parties as elitist and tribalist.
The rift between the Matiba and Odinga factions in FORD widened
during July 1992. with the two opposing camps establishing separate
headquarters, earning them the names Agip House and Muthithi House
factions after the respective buildings they operated from. The struggle
came to a head over the FORD party elections at its founding congress in
September 1992, both because Matiba unexpectedly announced that he
would challenge Odinga for the position of party chairman, and because the
two factions could not agree on election procedures. Whereas Odinga
proposed election of the presidential candidate by a delegates' conference,
Matiba insisted on direct election by all party members. In the end the
Matiba faction boycotted the party elections and unilaterally declared
Odinga' s election to the chairmanship of FORD null and void. As aresult,
the two factions went their separate ways and later registered as different
parties under the names of FORD-Kenya under Odinga, and FORD-Asili
("original FORD"), under Matiba.38 At a later stage, prominent members
of FORD-Asili, including Charles Rubia and Kimani wa Nyoike, left and
forme d the Kenya National Congress (KNC).
The split in FORD and the opposition seemed irevocable, despite efforts
to mend relations and bring about a reunification of the FORD factions.
Rumours also circulated of other possible alliances. In early November
1992, for example, it was suggested that talks about an electoral pact
between FORD-Kenya and DP was under way, with Kibaki willing to
content himself with a subordinate role in the arrangement.39 Nothing
c ame of this, possibly because the future president would be
36 Weekly Review, 5 June 1992, p. 6.
37 Ibid.
38 The Matiba faction referred to itself as the "original" FORD because it claimed to adhere
to the original constitution of FORD which prescribed direct election of party officers
among the party members.
39 Africa Confidential, voL. 33, no. 22, 6 November 1992.
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constitutionally required to form a government from his own party only,
thus foreclosing any attempts at a future coalition government.40
A more promising initiative surfaced in late September 1992 from
Wangari Maathai, herself a FORD-Kenya member and a prominent
environmental activist, who tried to reconcile the bickering factions, at least
enough for them to rally behind one common presidential candidate.
Having declined a party nomination herself, her initiative, known as the
Middle Ground Group (MGG), tried to persuade both the voters and the
parties that a united opposition was the only guarantee for defeating Moi
at the polls. Her group, active until nomination day in December, did not
succeed.
When Maathai urged the leaders of the opposition parties not to ignore
the appeals of the electorate and not to "pursue their objectives and
ambitions as if nothing else mattered" , she was addressing the very nature
of Kenyan politics in that pre-election stage. The opposition parties were
split not over fundamentally different political platforms, which were of
little apparent relevance in the election campaign, but rather over their
leaders' personal ambitions to reach high political office. The ethnic
divisions reflected in the party leaders exacerbated the problems - as
noted by a member of FORD-Kenya who likened their executive meetings
to geography lessons, and was quoted to have said: "Wesit and look at
maps and try to anticipate who will vote for who, according to their tribe.
That is all that matters."41 How little difference the party platforms and
manifestos made and how much personal ambitions mattered, is also
evidenced by the almost indiscriminate toing and fro ing between parties by
some politician whose personal ambitions were not immediately satisfied
in the nomination process as anticipated. In the event, all this lent some
credence to the assertion by President Moi that KANU was the only viable
national party.
40 Africa Confidential, vol. 33, no. 21, 23 October 1992.
41 Quoted in Africa Confidential, voL. 33, no. 20, 9 October 1992, p. 4.
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3. Events of Election Day
3.1 General Atmosphere on Election Day
All observers, monitors and the media agreed that election day itself
proceeded with astonishingpeace and quiet, thanks to what some observers
terme d the "dogged determination" of the Kenyan people to exercise their
democratic right. However, tensions ran high and an atmosphere of extreme
suspicion overshadowed the outwardly peaceful process, leading to
frustration and in some cases outbreaks of violence in and around polling
stations. The frustrations of the electorate were due largely to the clearly
inadequate logistics of the elections, but in some cases - possibly fuelled
or reinforced by the former problems - accusations of misconduct and
allegations ofmalpractice led to clashesbetween votersand/orparty agents"
and presiding officers as well as to clashes between party supporters.
It soon became evident on election day that preparations for the elections
had been grossly inadequate, and organisation was poor. This related
mainly to the late opening of most polling stations, the closing down of
polling streams, and the lack of essential materials.
3.2 Late Opening of Polling Stations
The majority of polling stations opened later than the announced time of 6
a.m. While most stations started balloting during the morning, others did
not until the middle or late afternoon. Some poll ing stations, e.g. in Kisumu
and Nambale, were reported to have received ballot boxes as late as the
early morning after election day.42 In Tana River elections could not take
place at all on election day because of floods, and had to be postponed.
The late apening of stations was explained by the late arrival of election
materials, be they ballot boxes, registers or ballot papers, or indeed the late
arrival of presiding officers or election clerks. In many cases ballot papers
or electoral rolls had been mixed up between polling stations or
constituencies, and in same cases candidates where found to be missing on
both parliamentary and civic election ballots, or candidates' names and
42 Daily Nation, 30 December, 1992.
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party symbols had been transposed. Other polling stations received ballot
boxes without lids.
Although these reasons may have seemed "harmless" enough, implying
no malice or design, they created suspicion and fear on the part of the
voters, many of whom had congregated long before opening time and had
remained uninformed about the reasons for and the expected extent of the
delays.
By contrast, in smaller polling stations, e.g. in Kangundo constituency,
opening delays extended no more than about one hour. Balloting proceeded
in an orderly fashion and was completed well ahead of the announced
closing time. PresidingofficersreportedhakunamatataC'no problems').
3.3 Lack of Election Materials
Insufficient or wrong electionmaterials continued to cause delays during
the voting. In a good number of polling stations voting had to be
temporarily halted because ballot papers ran out. In Nyahururu, for
example, presidential ballots were reported to have run out after only 300
of the 1600 registered voters had cast their vote.43 Necessary implements,
such as ink and stamps, were also insufficient. In Embakasi, Nairobi, only
four bottles of indelible ink for marking the fingers of those who had voted
were available for thirteen streams of voters, and in other stations the
stamps of the electoral commssion wore out half way through the voting
exercise.44 In St. Xavier Primary School, Nakuru Town constituency, there
was only one stamp to be shared by 14 streams, which naturally caused
serious delays. In many cases delays continued to occur due to faulty or
incomplete voter registers, which meant clerks and officers had to check
voters' names in master files.
3.4 Reduction of Number of Polling Streams
In many polling stations the announced number of polling streams was
reduced, ostensibly because the polling station was inadequately staffed or
had insufficient materials. The decision to close down prescribed polling
streams was apparently left to the discretion of the presiding officer. The
at times substantial reduction of voting capacity resulted in longer waiting
hours. Such slow-down caused rumours of deliberate go-slow tactics, and
43 Daily Nation, 30 December, 1992.
44 Daily Nation and Kenya Times, 30 December, 1992.
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raised fears that many voters would be unable to vote or be discouraged
from waiting their turn. More serious were rumours that the unused ballot
boxes of closed streams would be available for stuffing. In some cases,
such as at Ngong polling station in Kajiado North constituency, these
allegations were fuelled by differing opinions about the numbers of streams
that had been closed or merged.
While in many cases allegations of malpractice and fraud were closely
tied to the logistical shortcomings of the elections, they could also relate to
the allegedly suspicious behaviour of election officials, party agents,
candidates, and persons unknown.
3.5 U ndue Influencing of V oters
Accusations that voters were unduly influenced were levelled against
election officials and parties alike. They were heard from voters and
candidates of both opposition and ruling parties, by the authors themselves
and were also widely reported by the media. The KANU parliamentary
candidate of Langata constituencyin Nairobi, Richard Leakey, claimed, for
example, that FORD-Kenya supporters had harassed voters in the vicinity
of the polling stations. Similar allegations were directed by the opposition
against Leakey' s supporters and Leakey himself. In other instances voters
claimed that returning officers and/or party agents were unduly influencing
voters within polling stations, and that agents of parties were handing out
money to voters.45
Allegations of undue voter influencing were particularly strong with
reg ard to the large number of illiterate voters, or those who appeared to
require procedural assistance. The problem was exacerbated by the inability
of such voters to be guided by the party symbols that appeared on the
ballot. In many cases illiterate voters were openly and audibly asked for
their preference by either an electoral official, a party agent, or a monitor,
and the mark was then duly made in the presence of all. While this method
precluded to some degree the fraudulent marking of ballots, it rendered the
voting anything but secret, and the voters susceptible to all kinds of more
or less subtle influencing. In other cases, election monitors - on the
strength of their impartiality - assisted voters without witnesses in the
polling booth, thus achieving somewhat more secrecy but less control. If
many voters were uninformed about the meaning of the party symbols on
their ballot, they also seemed uninformed about voting by secret ballot as
45 Cf. Commonwealth Secretariat, ap.eit., p. 36.
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such, and required further instructions, which again invited allegations of
fraud. Stories abounded that voters were instructed that they cross off the
party they did not wish to vote for. In one case voters refused to mark their
ballots with the pencils provided, thus rejecting the claim by the presiding
officer that this was necessary "in order to assist illiterate voters,
contending that it would be easier to correct any mistake".46
3.6 Extended Polling Hours
Since most polling stations had opened late, polling hours were extended
accordingly. In many cases this meant that polling station operated well
into the evening and night. Lighting then proved a problem. Allocations of
kerosene or gas lamps were insufficient and the proceedings had to take
place in near darkness. In Ngong, one gas light was avaIlable for each
stream - in that case a classroom. Jf the polling clerks had barely enough
light to do their work, the polling booths were in almost total darkness,
forcing voters to mark their ballots wherever they could find a ray of light.
Later on, torches were provided to voters, but they did not provide the
necessary secrecy either. The late hours caused voters, furthermore, to
throng into the polling station in great numbers; voting speeded up
considerably, but all in all confusion ruled. In such an atmosphere it was
almost impossible to monitor the voting closely. In other cases it was
reported that polling stations, such as in Amagoro constituency, closed for
the night to reopen the next day, or they were closed early when no further
voters seerned to be present.
3.7 Location of Polling Stations and "Importation" of V oters
Only one day before polling was to commence, the locations of 30 polling
stations were changed and gazetted. The daily papers ran a list of the new
locations, but these changes were not always announced properly at the
polling stations themselves. The Commonwealth Observer Team reports
that polling stations also had to be changed on election day itself, either
because they proved to be inadequate or they were located in KANU-
owned or used buildings.47 These changes caused severe delays and
confusion, and might have disenfranchised voters.
46
Standard, 30 December, 1992.
47 Commonwealth Secretariat, ap. cit., p. 33.
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Many of the displaced victims of the ethnic clashes prior to the elections
also seerned to have been effectively disenfranchised. Clash victims in
Burnt Forest, Eldoret South constituency, for example, were on election day
not provided with the mobile polling stations promised them by the
Electoral Commission. An election observer at a debriefing session two
days after the elections recalled having come across a large group of people
in the Rift Valley who identified themselves as clash victims. They were
escorted by armed policemen. According to the observer' s reading of the
encounter, the displaced people were being escorted to a polling station to
vote. Members oLthe national monitoring team,NEMU,were inclined,
however, to adopt the diametrically opposite interpretation that these people
were thus being prevented from voting by armed coercion.
Allegations abounded about "importation" of voters across the country
to particularly contested districts, implicating both KANU and opposition
parties. Such malpractices were distinctly possible, as indicated by repeated
comments and warnings on the matter by the Electoral Commssion.48
Unlawful voting by Somali refugees was also alleged.
3.8 Other Irregularities
Allegations of blatant rigging were also reported. In one polling station, a
c1erk was caught while putting a wrong mark on the ballot of an illiterate
voter.49 The Commonwealth Observer Group reported another clerk being
caught while erasing marked ballots, and observed attempts at ballot
stuffing. Voters in Langata constituency, Nairobi, were reported to have
discovered ballot boxes in the car of the KANU candidate which were
apparently filled with KANU T-shirts and pre-marked ballot papers. In
Siaya town at least three ballot boxes for the presidential election were
seized from a polling station by unidentified men. 
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3.9 The Counting of Ballots
The organisational shortcomings and irregularities of election day carried
over into the counting process. The commencement of counting was in
most cases seriously delayed; the counting procedure was cumbersome and
slow; the announcement of results was in many cases also delayed; and
48 Daily Nation, 29 December 1992.
49 Standard, 30 December 1992.
50 Daily Nation, 30 December 1992.
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numerous irregularities were reported. All these factors contributed to an
atmosphere of extreme suspicion in the counting halls and amongst Kenyan
citizens, resulting in further delays while accusations of malpractice were
negotiated and recounts demanded and ordered.
3.10 Delays in the Counting Proeess
Serious delays were experienced in the starting of counting due to the late
arrival of ballot boxes from the polling stations to the counting centres. In
Kajiado Northconstituency,forinstance,counting wasdelayed by 12 hours
because the ballot boxes from two stations arived late. In other stations
delays were even longer.5l At one polling station in Machakos Town a
row arose between the presiding officer and the party agents over the
transportation of the ballot boxes to the counting centre. Only one vehicle
was available, and it could not accommodate the presiding officer, the
armed security guards and the party agents in addition to nine ballot boxes.
It was finally agreed that the party agents would escort the Landrover on
foot to the counting centre which was relatively close by. In the end,
however, another vehicle emerged and the matter resolved itself. Although
in most instances transport problems were cited as the cause of the delays,
they seerned inordinately long in urban or semi-urban constituencies alike,
such as in Nairobi. The transport delays raised questions as to what had
happened to the ballot boxes in the intervening time, particularly in cases
where they were not accompanied by all party agents, such as was reported
from Kajiado North. 
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Once counting had started, slowness and delays persisted. In Westlands,
Nairobi, for example, only 25 per cent of the total votes cast had been
counted after 14 hours. In Langata, Nairobi, the number ofuncounted ballot
boxes seemed still overwhelming when counting had been underway for
well over 36 hours. Other counting centres were no different. In Machakos
Town it took two and a half hours to complete the counting of five ballot
boxes after several recounts, i.e. half an hour per ballot box. Jf counting
each of the remaining 160 ballot boxes would have taken equally long, the
entire process would have lasted another 80 hours continuously or more
than three full days. To a large degree these problems resulted from
interventions by party agents concerning both procedures and faults in the
counting. In Kajiado North interrptions were caused by counts proven to
51 Daily Nation, 31 December 1992.
52 Ibid.
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be erroneous, as well as in Westlands, Kamukunji and Makadara, Nairobi.
In the lattertwo centres, recounts were ordered after three days of counting.
Even though faulty counts could be attributed to lack of attention by
exhausted counting clerks, allegations of deliberate malpractice also
surfaced.
In Langata observers claimed to have witnessed the deliberate counting
of opposition votes in favour of KANU, an accusation which heightened
tensions in all Nairobi counting stations, causing agents to order recounts
for every bundle and to check every ballot in every bundle. In Molo
opposition agents allegedlydiscovered bundles of unfolded ballots with
consecutive serial numbers in ane of the polling boxes - and a national
monitor who apparently photographed the ballots in question was,
moreover, temporarily held in police custody.53 Other allegations of fraud
included the shifting of additional ballots onto the counting table; and as
counting continued, persistent rumours circulated of marked or unmarked
ballot papers being found under counting tab les, on the streets or outside
the windows of counting stations. In re action to rumours of a KANU plot
to sabotage the counting, the FORD-Kenya parliamentary candidate for
Langata constituency, Raila Odinga, brought his own floodlight, generator
and security guards into the counting hall. Incidents like these, however,
appear to have been exceptions found in particularly tense areas, rather than
reflecting a general situation.
The protracted and controversial nature of the counting procedure also
led to deteriorating security conditions. In some counting centres large
numbers of unauthorised people crowded around the counting tab les,
interfering in the work of the counting clerks and thus further hampering
progress. In Langata constituency, unrest broke out when a group of
FORD-Kenya supporters gained entrance to the counting hall, and persisted
in making comments to the counting by loud cheering and shouting.
Attempts of the returning officer, the parliamentary candidate, Leakey, and
members of the Electoral Commssion who were called in to remove the
crowd, failed. How very serious the presence of unauthorised personneI in
the counting halls could be, was exemplified by dramatic events in Kibwezi
constituency, Eastern Province, where an unlawfully present District
Officer, inside the counting centre, fired several shots at the winning DP
parliamentary candidate, Agnes Ndetei, but missed. However, her
companion was seriously wounded and had to be rushed to hospitaL.
The election results were slow in being announced, far beyond what
could have been expected due to counting delays. The International Press
53 Daily Nation, L January 1993.
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Centre, established by the government, had promised to giv e journalists
direct access to the results as they came in. But, in fact, reporters had to
rely entirely on the intermittent television announcements. These failures
further undermined confidence in the elections, particularly as it transpired
that the results from KANU strongholds seem to have been relayed first.
The counting process remained flawed, and - as time wore on and
counting clerks and observers grew more exhausted - offered opportunities
for rigging, even though the encountered problems were, as the IRI has
pointed out, "a necessary cost to ensure transparency". 54 Many of the
international elections observers had left thecounting . c entre s and some
even the country long before counting was completed.
54 International Republican Institute, Preliminary Statement of Findings, Kenyan General
Elections, 29 December, 1992.
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4. Immediate Aftermath
4.1 Results of the Presidential Contest
As counting proceeded and results were announced constituency by
constituency, it became increasingly clear that the incumbent government
party, KANU, was doing far better than expected. In fact, the presidential
elections, with a turn-out rate of 68.4 per cent, provided President Moi with
a fresh mandate for another five-year term, given the country' s plurality
system of election. With 1,962,866 votes Moi beat his closest rival,
Kenneth Matiba, by a comfortable margin of 558,600 votes.55 The number
of votes garnered by Moi accounted for 36.3 per cent of the votes cast,
whereas Matiba got 26 per cent. However, a casual glance at the table
below will reveal that an alliance of any pair of the other three major
contenders would have out-voted Moi. Together the three of them
accounted for 63 per cent of the total vote. In other words, Moi does not
enjoy the support of the majority of the Kenyan people, just over one-third
of the electorate.
A winning presidential candidate had to satisfy three requirements to get
elected:
(a) Being elected a member of Parliament from his/her parliamentary
constituency;
(b) Getting a plurality of the votes in the presidential election, i.e. the
largest number of votes among the presidential contestants, though not
necessarily a majority;
(c) Garnering at least 25 per cent of the vote in five of the eight
provinces.
All the four main presidential contenders were elected MPs in their
constituencies, and any pair of them would have garnered a plurality of the
votes if they had joined forces in an alliance. However, only the
MatibaJOdinga and Matiba/Kibaki alliances would have met the 25 per cent
criterion in five provinces. The KibakiOdinga alliance would have barely
55 See table l. in appendix B for detailed results by provinceand presidential candidate.
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missed the mark by falling slightly short in Coast and Western
provinces.56
It is also revealing to look at the distribution of votes for Moi. His home
province, Rift Valley, repeatedly declared an exclusive "KANU zone", is
clearly his Kalenjin stronghold, although in percentage terms he also caried
North Eastern (inhabited predominantly by ethnic Somali) by a wide
margin. In the latter province the opposition parties were effectively kept
out, partly due to very real security problems, which were also used as a
pretext by the Provincial Administration to bar the opposition from
campaigning. By contrast to his success in Rift Valley and North Eastern
provinces, Moi had negligible support inCentralProvince; his supportwas
also very weak in Nairobi and Nyanza provinces. Despite these disparities
of support, Moi gamered at least 25 per cent of the vote in five of the eight
provinces as required by the Constitution. With some justification Moi may
thus claim broader support nationwide than any of his competitors, despite
faring dismally in Central and Nyanza provinces.
Support for the other presidential candidates mirrors Moi's pattern of
support. The Kikuyu heartland of Central Province was divided between
Matiba and Kibaki, who mustered 96.2 per cent combined, Matiba leading
with 60.1 per cent and Kibaki trailing behind with 36.1 per cent. Similarly
Odinga carried Nyanza Province, the Luo heartland, with 74.7 per cent. DP
also performed well in Eastern Province, notably in Embu and Meru
districts.
This geography of support also testifies to the persistence of the politics
of ethnicity in Kenya. Ethnic affiliation was widely used as a basis of
mobilisation during the electoral campaign, and presidential election figures
confirm that Kenyans still vote largely along ethnic lines.
4.2 The Parliamentary Constellation
Basically the same pattem is found in the results from the parliamentary
elections.57 The distribution of seats by province shows that KANU won
36 of the 44 seats from Rift Valley, 17 of the 20 seats in Coast Province,
eight of the ten seats from North Eastem and 21 of the 32 seats in Eastern.
FORD-Asili, by contrast, won 14 of the 25 seats in Central province and
6 of the 8 seats in Nairobi. With the L O seats in Central Province won by
56 See table 2 in appendix B for calculations with regard to hypothetical alliances in the
presidential election.
57 See table 3 in appendix B for a distribution of parIiamentary seats by party and province.
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DP, FORD-Kenya was the only other party that managed to win a seat in
Central Province, but its candidate was a Kikuyu.
Up to a point, the four major parties can thus be said to be regionally
based. It is a historical irony that after this 1992 election the Kikuyu-Luo
alliance is in opposition whereas the former KADU ethnic groupings rally
around Moi' s leadership, but this time under the KANU umbrella. Still, the
politics and policies of KANU of 1993 are reminiscent of KADU at around
independence.
Apart from the ethnic composition of Parliament, the overall
parliamentary constellation in the aftermath of the elections is such that
KANU has a majority, whereas the opposition commands 88 seats. In
addition the President may nominate 12 MPs, but even with this addition
the incumbent party falls short of the three-quarter majority required to
amend the Constitution. Conversely, the opposition is even further away
from succeeding in making amendments to the Constitution, with which
they are highly dissatisfied.
4.3 To Acknowledge Defeat or Not?
The opposition was reluctant to acknowledge defeat. Before the counting
was completed, the three leaders of the major opposition parties on 1
January 1993 called a joint press conference to announce their rejection of
the results on grounds that the election had been massively rigged. This
move met with criticism from within their own ranks and among clergymen
who seerned to fe el that Parliament would be a better arena for continuing
the struggle, rather than risking more civil strife and harsh reprisals by the
victor, Moi, even to the point of declaring a state of emergency.
Although despondent at the prospects of another five years until a next
chance at the polls, elements of the opposition also directed criticism
against their leaders for not having realised the dangers of splitting the
opposition vote three ways and thus serving victory on a silver plate for
Moi. Repeated calls in the run-up to the elections for unit y in the
opposition, notably by the Middle Ground Group (MGG), the NCCK and
the Catholic Secretariat, had fallen on deaf ears.
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5. Conclusion
5.1 An Overall Assessment: Free and Fair?
The irregularities and problems encountered in the run-up to the elections
and in the balloting and counting phases cast very serious doubts indeed on
the freeness and fairness of the general elections held in Kenya on 29
December 1992. The credible and corroborated evidence adduced, even if
part of it may be merely circumstantial or impressionistic, will go a long
way towards supporting such a conclusion. It is doubtful, however, whether
it is sufficient for passing a definitive judgement. Such a judgement is
made all the more difficult by a situation which does not lend itself to
distinct dichotomous verdicts of free and fair, or not free and fair. From the
perspectivedof analysis andrecognised international standards regarding the..
conduct of elections, such a dichotomy is no doubt usefuL. Social reality is
more complex, however, and does not generally fit into simple dichotomies.
At what point are the irregularities so numerous and so grave that elections
cease to be free and fair? What is the tolerance level with respect to
irregularities? There are no clear-cut, universally agreed, answers to those
questions. Ultimately, it is a matter of weighing the positive aspects of the
conduct of an election against the flaws and irregularities and then arriving
at an assessment, however subjective or arbitrary it might be.
Reference to complex social realities which differ from one country to
another and which defy neat categorisation does not mean that dual
standards are being applied. The standards are universal, yet modified and
adapted to local conditions as the case may be. All the same, when
embarking on a journey from authoritarian rule towards democratic
governance, one cannot reasonably expect all the standards to be met
instantaneously. Democracy is a continuous struggle; it is not something to
be acquired and owned once a set of formal institutions are in place, such
as periodic elections. More than anything else, democracy is about
nurturing a political culture of compromise and tolerance, and that is a
long-term project.
Even if answers to the initial questions above were available, the
difficulty is further compounded by the brevity of the visits by international
observers and their limited number which were hardly commensurate with
the task. There were in excess of 7,000 polling stations across the country,
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many with several streams and a few with as many as 20 streams.
Altogether the Electoral Commssioned established 10,449 streams
nationwide.58 The internationalobservers numbered about 165 only and
local monitors at least 6,000.59 Information is patchy as to the percentage
of polling stations monitored and particularly as regards the geographical
distribution of observers and monitors. In fact, indications are that
internationalobservers sought out particularly contested constituencies or
"trouble spots". By doing so a bias of coverage may have been introduced,
perhaps unwittingly. It is safe to say, therefore, that coverage was
inadequate relative to the mandate. Jf election monitoring were to be
likene d to conducting a'samplesurveyone might . say that the samplewas
small and biased, the response rate was low, and the margin of error
correspondingly wide. The political sensitivity of the situation did not make
it any easier to validate responses.
The countless irregularities noted could, theoretically, be attributed to the
inexperience, incompetence or negligence of the Electoral Commission,
rather than design on the part of the incumbent government allegedly
working through the Electoral Commssion or otherwise. Kenya had not
held a multi-party election since the "Little General Election" in 1966. The
magnitude and logistics of conducting the 29 December 1992 elections
were colossal for an inexperienced Electoral Commssion, and for the
scores of electoral officials whose dedication to their duties was generally
commendable. It is exceedingly difficult, or well-nigh impossible, to
distinguish between irregularities attributable to inexperience and logistical
problems in trying circumstances from those springing from political design
by any party to the process, be they the Electoral Commssion, electoral
officials, counting clerks, contending parties or state officials.
Legal responsibility for the conduct of the elections rested, of course,
with the Electoral Commssion; its competence and performance were
decisive for the final result. However, the Electoral Commission also
operated within certain constraints for which it cannot be blamed, strictly
speaking. Two sets of circumstances were particularly important in that
respect. The failure by the government to ensure timely issuance of national
58 International Republican Institute, Kenya: The December 29, 1992 Elections,
(Washington D.C.: IRI, n.d.), pp. 41-4259 It has not been possible to obtain information about the exact numbers of international
observers and local monitors accredited by the Electoral Commission. But the National
Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU) alone reports to have recruited a total of 5,000
pollwatchers. Cf. National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), A Report on Kenya
December 1992 Multi-Party Elections, Nairobi, February 1993, draft, appendix 5:
NEMUs Monitoring Activities, p. 3.
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ID cards to an unknown but probably high number of young persons who
had reached voting age since the 1988 election, led to the effective
disenfranchisement of a sizable proportion of the electorate. Although the
voter registration period was too brief and faulty in other ways, the
Electoral Commssion could do little to redress this particular problem once
registration had started. The government, on the other hand, had known, at
least since the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution, that elections were
forthcoming. It was to be expected, therefore, that the appropriate
government body, in a democratic spirit, would have seen to it that no
citizen of Kenya wouldbeqdisenfranchised on a practical technicality. Jf the
co st of suchanoperationwere aserious stumbling block,.severaldonors.
would have been likely contributors to overcome cost constraints.
N onetheless, the Electoral Commission cannot be completely exonerated
with respect to the ID card scandaL. The Electoral Commission knew just
as well as the government that ID cards for all adult citizens above the age
of 18 were a precondition for successful registration. Hence, the Electoral
Commission should have alerted the government to this potential problem
and pressed for its resolution at an early stage, well in advance of the
registration period in mid-1992. The present team is not aware that the
Electoral Commssion made any such representations vis-à-vis the
government.
The second set of mitigating circumstances from the viewpoint of the
Electoral Commssion relates to the security of candidates. The provision
of security rested with the government, i.e. the police. The kidnapping of
a number of candidates en route to the relevant returning officers in order
to submit their nomination papers at the announced time, and the snatching
of briefcases containing nomination papers, clearly show that security
precautions were grossly inadequate. Such negligence on the part of the
police led to the automatic declaration of a considerable number of KANU
candidates as winners of the election since they had stood unopposed.
It is difficult to say whether a substantial reduction in irregularities,
whatever their nature and gravity, would have yielded a qualitatively
different result in the end. It should be recalled that nearly two-thirds of the
electorate said no to Moi' s continued reign for another five years. Is it
inconceivable that slightly more than one-third of the electorate, considering
its geographical distribution, would see their interest furthered by a KANU
government?
In these circumstances the present team is not prepared to state, in
unequivocal terms, that the Kenyan general elections of 1992 were free and
fair, or that they were not free and fair. The opening statement of this
concluding section is as far as the evidence will carry us.
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N otwithstanding international standards for the cond4ct of elections and
the duty to judge events and processes against those standards only,
internationalobservers cannot divorce themselves entirely from the
Realpolitik of the situation in the aftermath of an election. Extreme
circumspection should be exercised in order not to influence that situation
directly. On the other hand, any team of internationalobservers cannot
escape influencing somehow the course of events in an indirect way, simply
by making astatement, whatever its content. In a charged political
atmosphere internationalobservers have little controlover the interpretation
of their statements by the con ten ding forces, and the use or abuse of them
for various political purposes. 'Inthe' specific case of Kenya, a losing and
despondent opposition would, naturally, have liked critical statements by
internationalobservers to support calls for a fresh election. Conversely, the
victorious incumbent government party would have preferred lenient
statements to lend legitimacy to the exercise just completed. B y
implication, the benefit of the doubt would tend to accrue to the recorded
election results and thus contribute to legitimising them. The inadequacy of
the evidence would, therefore, willy-nilly work to the benefit of the victor.
Analogous to the problem of classifying elections as free and fair or not
free and fair, it is also problematic to categorise societies or political
systems as either democratic or dictatoriaL. It is more fruitful to place a
given society on a continuum between the two extremes. In other words,
societies may be more or less democratic at given points in time.
Subsequently they may mo ve progressively in either direction. The
elections of 29 December 1992, despite flaws and irregularities, no doubt
signify that Kenya is mo ving in a democratic direction relative to the
situation obtaining prior to the repeal of section 2A of the Constitution. The
run-up to the election and the period of political fermentation before that
time, the campaign and the elections themselves have created a wider
democratic space in Kenya. The embryo of a new democratic political
culture is discernable and from it is likely to emerge a genuinely
democratic practice. True, there will continue to be setbacks and hurdles to
be overcome. But the path and direction has been charted and it is now for
the people of Kenya to move along, however arduously and painstakingly.
5.2 A Self-Critical Note
The problems of coverage and evidence resulting in the inability of
observer team to pass definitive and unequivocal judgements as to the
freeness and fairness of elections, warrants a self-critical note. When
making an auto-critique it is necessary to distinguish between election
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observing as an institution in itself and the professionalism, or lack of such,
of the election observers in discharging their task. This note addresses the
latter.
Inadequate attention has thus far been devoted to specifying a set of
criteria to be satisfied in order to inject more professionalism into election
observing. There ought at least to be clear rules of thumb on a number of
requirements.
First, an appropriate ratio of observers to the number of polling stations
in a country or the size of the electorate should be established. As noted
above, in the Kenyan case the ratio was too low.
Second, an even geographical distribution of internationalobservers
should be ensured. Although the distribution in Kenya on and around 29
December 1992 is not known precisely, there is enough evidence to sugge st
that certain critical parts of the country were hardly covered at all.
Third, a coordinated effort should be mounted by all observers to
facilitate easy flow and processing of information. This would require
centralising detailed reporting on incidents and specification of visits to
polling stations. It would, furthermore, give the coordinating body a
mandate to direct operations, including deployment of observers during all
phases of the exercise. In Kenya such coordination was done by the
Commonwealth and IRI teams for their own members. But there were only
rudimentary, albeit commendable, efforts by aUN unit atcoordinating the
smaller teams and facilitating liaison with the operations of the larger ones.
It should be considered whether overall and firmer coordination in the
future could be done under UN auspices. Although such a proposal is likely
to be resisted in some quarters because it entails recognition by teams of
various origins and persuasions of a UN body to take on the task, it should,
nevertheless, be explored.
Fourth, procedures for liaising with local monitoring teams should be
worked out, since local knowledge of the situation is a precondition for
successful observation. The complementarity of internationalobservers and
local monitors should be emphasised. In Kenya such liaison was generally
poor and mostly left to individuals.
Fifth, the period of stay for most observers was much too brief. An
observer can hardly get a fe el for the situation and appreciate its intricacies
if arriving a few days before election day and leaving shortly thereafter.
Although this is largelya question of funding, as a general rule about two
weeks before election day and one week after would appear a minimum.
Shorter periods can partly be compensated for by pre-election visits. At any
rate, advance preparation through pre-election visits is indispensable.
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Sixth, prior to the actual elections, each of the teams should ensure that
they include expertise regarding the political, social and cultural fabric of
the country in question. It does not mean that all team members need to be
country experts, but a fair proportion should be.
Seventh, the role of the international donor community in funding various
NGOs and local monitoring outfits should be scrutinised with a view to
ensuring better coordination. Although an informal donor forum did exist
in Kenya for some time in the run-up to the elections, its main purpose
appears to have been information sharing. As such it had a certain
coordinating effect, although it was not mandated to coordinate activities
in a stricter sense. Rather, donors tended to pursue their own agendas.
39

Appendix A:
Interim Statement by the Scandinavian-Canadian Observer
Team on the Kenya General Elections 1992
An independent team of six Scandinavian-Canadian election observers
representing non-governmental organisations visited on and around election
day a total of 45 polling stations and five counting centres in Rift Valley
and Eastern provinces and Nairobi area. Some team members also made
visits to Kenya during the run-up to the elections. Drawing on our own
observations and evidence from credible reports by a large number . of
voters, local monitors as well as on returning and presiding officers, party
agents and written sources, we would like to make an interim statement of
our findings.
We commend the Kenyan voters for their untiring patience in the face of
frustrating delays and their relentless commtment to the democratic process
in exercising their rights. Not least did their peaceful conduct at the polling
stations bear witness to their democratic spirit. Vigilance and alertness on
the part of voters and party agents alike made a significant contribution to
reducing the number and gravity of irregularities. We also commend the
many electoral officials who in trying circumstances for the most part
exhibited dedication in the discharge of their duties.
Serious delays in the opening of polling stations, which were caused by
logistical deficiencies, poor organisation and inexperience on the part of
election officials, were noted. In many instances lack of election materials
further slowed down the process. These problems were exacerbated in some
places by the closing down of streams and the shifting of polling station
locations at a very late stage. Despite commendable efforts in recent weeks
the preparation by the Electoral Commission of this ambitious election
exercise was clearly inadequate and its execution was marred by numerous
irregularities, particularly during the counting phase.
The events of polling day must be placed in the broader context of the
entire electoral process from registration onwards.
The registration process was flawed due to the allocated time period
being too short and the issuance of national identification cards being very
cumbersome and slow, leading to the effective disenfranchisement of large
numbers of youths. It is evident that the names of many citizens who
registered were not found on the lists on polling day. Moreover, anomalies
were noted in the voters' register, suggesting importation of voters.
Ethnic clashes in some parts of the country and incidents of provoked
political violence created an environment not conducive to free elections.
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The declaration of some areas as the exclusive zones of particular parties
was inimical to competitive politics and free political expression. The use
of intolerant and threatening language by politicians across the political
spectrum had a similar effect. Coercion and intimidation of voters and
candidates were found in areas dominated by particular parties, both the
ruling party and opposition parties.
Unequal access to the electronic mass media did not contribute to the
fairness of electoral campaigning. However, this was to some extent
compensated for by the vibrant printed media which recently have achieved
a wider scope of expression.
The use by the Government oflegalandadministrativemeasures to
H prevent or obstruct the holding of campaign rallies by the opposition,
through its refusal to issue required permits as requested, introduced
unfairness into the campaign. In some constituencies chiefs and other local
officials acted as virtual agents of the ruling party, thus introducing pressure
and intimidation of opposition candidates and voters at the local leveL. Such
discriminatory malpractices emanate from the failure to de-link state
functions from the structures of the incumbent Government party.
Harassment of candidates continued throughout the campaign period, and
obstruction of candidates upon their presentation of nomination papers
reduced the democratic competitiveness and fairness of contestation. The
number of pending court cases pertaining to abduction of candidates on
nomination day points to an undemocratic climate of electoral competition.
Credible and corroborated allegations about the widespread use of money
to influence voters unduly were noted. So-called defections - whatever
their causes - by candidates after completion of the nomination process
are likely to have caused confusion on the part of voters and may have
influenced voting patterns.
Taken together, the above irregularities and problems have compromised
the electoral process and cast serious doubts on its freeness and fairness.
However, there is not as yet adequate information available to justify a
definitive assessment in this regard. Furthermore, it is not yet possible to
evaluate to what degree flaws in the electoral process affected the general
outcome of the elections. Candidates and parties with grievances should
seek redress through appropriate channeIs, including the judiciary.
On a self-critical note internationalobservers should acknowledge that
they paid inadequate attention to the counting phase of the process during
which opportunities for rigging were greater than during balloting. The
delays and the accompanying climate of extreme suspicion characterising
balloting and counting tended to wear out clerks, officials and party agents,
thus rendering the process more open to error and malpractices.
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Furthermore, the internationalobservers have been too few in number to
secure adequate coverage in a country of Kenya' s size. Coordination
between observer groups could also have been better.
Regardless of the finaloutcome of the 1992 elections Kenya has without
a doubt taken a critical step towards democratic rule. The determination of
the Kenyan people to forge ahead towards nurturing a democratic political
culture has been expressed and should not be stopped.
N otwithstanding possible setbacks and frustrations that may be
experienced in the future towards that end, it is hoped that these historic
events have set Kenya on the path to a genuinely democratic system of
governance.
Arne Tostensen
Team Leader
Nairobi, 2 January 1993
The Scandinavian-Canadian Election Observer Team was drawn from the
following institutions:
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway;
International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development,
Montreal, Canada;
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Oslo, Norway;
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund,
Sweden.
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Table 2
Distribution of V otes by Pair of Opposition Candidates.
Absolute Numbers and Percentages
Province MATIBA MA TIBA KIBAKI
+ + +
KIBAKI ODINGA ODINGA
Nairobi 235,248 241,431 145,613
62.6 % 64.3 % 38.8 %
Coast 59,364 86,114 74,282
19.0 % 27.5 % 23.7 %
North Eastern L 0,737 12,677 8,534
14.6 % 17.3 % 11.6 %
Eastern 479,242 93,579 411,791
60.7 % 11.9 % 52.2 %
Central 994,305 632,133 383,702
96.2 % 61.1 % 37.1 %
Rift Valley 385,109 357,956 195,043
26.2 % 24.4 % 13.3 %
Western 211,974 287,710 113,966
39.9 % 54.2 % 21.5 %
Nyanza 78,884 636,843 661,883
9.7 % 78.0 % 81.1 %
Total 2,454,883 2,348,463 1,994,814
45.5 % 43.5 % 36.9 %
Source: At the time of writing (May 1993) the official election results had not yet been
published in the Kenya Gazette. The figures, on the basis of which the percentages have
been calculated by the authors of this report, emanate from press reports. Some
inconsistencies have been noted, but any corrections required after the official publication
of the election results are unlikely to alter the overall picture.
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Table 3
Kenya's Parliamentary Election 1992: Distribution of Seats
by Province and Party
Seats KANU FORD- FORD-K A2 4L 6
L 14
L
Province DP
Rift Valley
Nairobi
Central
Eastern
44
8
25
32
36
L
2
21
10
9
North 10 8 1
Eastern
N yanza 29 7 20 1
Coast 20 17 2 1
Western 20 10 3 7
Total 188 100 31 31 23
Source: Various press reports.
Others
1
(KNC)
1
(PICK)
1 (KSC)
3
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